IRAQ AND THE FORCE OF LAW: WHY GIVE A SHIELD OF IMMUNITY? .
As these words are written, the use of armed force to liberate Kuwait, and all the suffering and waste such use implies, becomes more likely. Given the primacy of the peaceful settlement of disputes in international law, I consider in this brief essay how the rule of law could play a role in this crisis. The UN Security Council's call for the collection of inforn1ation regarding possible war crimes by Iraqi officials and possible claims for damages arising out of the invasion was a welcome innovative effort, although it has yet to have any perceptible effect.
1 That move, however, did not fully embrace the rule of law as a solution or make clear to Iraq the force that the rule of law can bring to bear. If the Security Council made an effort to implement the rule of law more forcefully, in my view it would greatly diminish the felt need to use armed force against Iraq.
The Security Council's approach to date follows the traditional tendency to resort to an international claims process. Such a process, if implemented, would eventually provide some relief to the victims of this invasion.
2 But the possibility of such a process does not displace the perceived need for arn1ed force because it does not bring significant additional pressure to bear upon President Saddan1 Hussein. It fails to do so for two reasons. First, as it takes time to establish a new international clain1s process, the scope of the claims, the means of enforcen1ent, and hence the potential liability of Iraq remains undefined and vague. Second, the possible liability of Iraq is not a credible threat because it is not certain.
3 Rather, Hussein, if he thought about it, likely would be1ieve that such a claims process, both generally and as to the amount at risk, is another item that could be placed 8. Rt'minds Iraq that under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by lr.1q; 9. lut~iles States to collect relevant information regarding their claims, and those of their nationals and corporations, for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq with a view to such arrangements as may be established in accordance with international law. 2 Such a process also could be generous to Iraq if only the frozen assets are relied upon to satisfy the claims because those assets likely would not begin to cover the claims involved. The amount of Iraqi assets located outside Iraq, and the proportion of that amount that is actually frozen, is unclear. The gross amount, however, is believed to be significantly less than the assets abroad of many other members of OPEC because of the Iran-Iraq War and Iraq's estimated $50 billion foreign debt resulting from that war. The U.S. Commerce Department, for example, estimated that the total direct investment of Iraq in the United States as of 1988 was less than $500 million. In contrast, the Commerce Department estimated that the dir.ect investment of Kuwait in the United States as of 1988 was $3.8 billion. Bars $30 Billiou to Hussein, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, at AS, coL I (nat'l ed.) .
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3 St-P gmera/ly T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT I87-88 ( I960). within any negotiated settlement. In short, there is little additional pressure upon Hussein because the force of the rule of law seems distant and quite speculative. Consequently, for a rule-of-law strategy to demonstrate to Hussein the mounting tangible cost of the occupation of Kuwait, the strategy must be one that can be implemented quickly and in a manner that presents a credible threat. In my view, it is unlikely that the traditional claims settlement approach could meet these criteria. Instead, I suggest that a rule-of-law strategy should aim at bringing to bear the force of law possessed by municipal courts around the world.
The invasion of Kuwait did not result merely in disputes between.states. It also generated hundreds of thousands of individual claims of the sort that ordinary people might wish to raise if they had been hurt during the invasion. The primary barrier standing between these claims and the invocation of the rule of law in courts here or elsewhere is the sovereign immunity afforded to Iraq. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is present in all legal systems." It reflects the notion that sovereigns should not sit in judgment on one another, and thus embodies the respect accorded by states to each other. Even though its acts of aggression should not be accorded such respect, Iraq will probably be granted sovereign immunity. The doctrine even precludes municipal courts from deciding to strip Iraq of its immunity because of the egregiousness of this wrong. Perhaps the doctrine should be changed. 5 But municipal legislatures and courts should not need to consider such changes in this instance because the Security Council, acting on behalf of the international community, should make the determination that Iraq is not entitled to immunity. 6 The UN Charter in Articles 39 and 41 gives the Security Council broad authority to call upon member states to take measures so as to maintain or restore international peace and security. That the term "measure" can include determinations regarding the immunity of a state seems clear. First, if the Security Council can authorize the use of armed force, it a fortiori should be able to authorize the use of the coercive power of courts. Second, the Security Council has taken several actions that are similar in that they necessarily affect the practice of municipal courts. See, e.g., SC Res. 661, para. 5 (Aug. 6, 1990) (which, in providing for an economic embargo, calls upon all states "to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted"); SC Res. 662, para. 2 (Aug. 9, 1990) (calling upon all states not to recognize Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and "to refrain from any action . . . that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation"). Potentially more restrictive is the requirement that the measure be undertaken so as to maintain or restore international peace and security. In this sense, I find it particularly noteworthy that the Security Council in its resolution calling upon states to collect information regarding possible claims thought it important to reaffirm the goal of the international community of maintaining international peace and security by ·seeking to resolve international disputes and conflicts through peaceful means.
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Council calls upon all states to take appropriate measures so as to enable their municipal courts to deny assertions of sovereign immunity from adjudication or execution in actions against Iraq, its agencies or its controlled entities for claims arising out of or relating to the invasion or illegal occupation of Kuwait. Such a resolution would open the courts of the world. Very quickly, it would unleash, not divisions of soldiers, but thousands of claitnants. These claimants would include guest workers from Egypt and the Philippines, corporations from Europe and North America, and, of course, Kuwait and its citizens. The amounts claimed would be staggering.
7 They would mount each day Iraq remained in Kuwait and be enforceable wherever Iraqi assets could be found. Obviously, there are many possible variations upon such a resolution.
8 That the lawyer's skill need be brought to the difficult task of drafting, however, does not negate the central point; namely, that by perpetuating this dispute as one between states, the community does a disservice to the growing transnational strength of the rule of law.
A rule-of-law approach reduces much of the rationale of those who favor war. Their conviction that force should be used may reflect any of three assumptions: first, that the destruction of Kuwait must not be permitted to continue; second, that at some point the en1bargo will fail and Hussein will win; and third, that Hussein and his military apparatus cannot be allowed to survive. As to the first point, it is true that stripping Iraq of its legal immunity will not force it to pull out of Kuwait immediately. The key cost of a rule-of-law strategy, and of all the diplomatic initiatives thus far, is time-tin1e during which many Kuwaitis will remain exiled or oppressed by Iraq. Yet war also entails great, if not greater, human suffering.
As to the second point, long after the embargo ends, the rule of law will continue to be effective. 9 If Iraq sornehow were to remain in Kuwait, Kuwaiti oil shipped abroad would be seized and returned to its owner, Kuwait. If oil from Iraq were shipped abroad, it would be attached to satisfy judgments against Iraq.
As to the last point, although a rule-of-law approach will leave Iraq's military intact, the army will be decaying and useless because it cannot sustain itself independently of the outside world. Under a rule-of-law approach, every spare part bought by Iraq and loaded in Rotterdam after the en1bargo will be attached by a claimant holding a judgment against Iraq and its military. Consequently, the oftstated nightmare of Iraq withdra~ing from Kuwait with its military intact dissi-7 Egyptian officials, for example, estimate the loss of wages by the more than one million expatriate Egyptian workers to be $1.1 billion per year. Kifner, Gulf Price Tag for Egypt: $2 Billion Loss to Economy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1990, at AlO, col. 5. 8 The resolution, for example, could order the pooling of all currently frozen and future attached assets and direct all actions to enforce municipal judgments to a central body. Moreover, that administering body could be directed to give priority to, for example, judgments for human rights violations. 9 An economic embargo weakens in part the rule-of-law approach suggested in the text. judgments can be rendered and frozen assets used to satisfy such judgments while an embargo is in place; but if a comprehensive embargo is effective, new Iraqi assets will not appear outside Iraq. On the other hand, if the embargo develops leaks, the rule-of-law approach potentially will have new assets to draw upon and may be able to seal the leaks effectively. ln this sense. satisfaction of some judgments will need to await the end of the embargo. The complex interface between the embargo approach and the rule-oflaw approach reflects the fact that the embargo is an aggregate approach that operates internationally, while the rule of law is a decentralized approach that operates transnationally. One line of inqu~:r-y would be the circumstances in which a rule-of-law approach, both in an economic sense and in terms of fairness, would be preferable to an embargo approach. The embargo, for example, can injure the implementing group as much as the target state or, as in the present case. may hit specific members of the implementing group particularly hard. pates. Rather, when Iraq withdraws, mountains of debt will remain and Iraq will appreciate the waste of that army and the use to which it was put.
Aside from the fact that states may be chary of eroding the concept of immunity, even if only in the case of Security Council action, the main danger to the community of a rule-of-law approach is loss of control. Once instituted, the claims will amass quickly and the threat to Iraq will be credible because control of the process to a significant degree will have moved to the claimants and the courts involved. The question thus becomes: Is it in the community's interest to hobble the people of Iraq for years with the consequences of Hussein's megalomania? In part, the question relates to tne appropriateness of collective guilt. In part, the question reflects the need of any debtor to consolidate and schedule service of the debt. The answer to this problem lies in the retention of some control by the Security Council so that at a later date it can devise such mechanisms as it believes appropriate to govern and oversee the orderly satisfaction of judgments against Iraq.
A rule-of-law approach is not without costs or risks, but ultimately one must ask if it is not preferable to war. If armed force is used to liberate Kuwait, there will be both great human suffering and material loss. The oil-producing capabilities of Kuwait and Iraq may be devastated, disrupting the world economy. Similarly, the political and economic structure of the Middle East could be unsettled in unforeseeable ways. In contrast, unleashing the rule of law will not result in such waste. Moreover, since Iraqi industry would be left undamaged, its production after the embargo ends will be available to satisfy Iraq's debt to all those datnaged by the · invasion. In this way, true meaning could be given to the adage that aggression does not pay.
DAVID D. CARON* CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF MILITARY ACTIONS:
A COMPARATIVE DIMENSION Throughout history, decisions to go to war have been made by a handful of individuals in powerful positions. American constitutionalists from jan1es Madison's day through our own have tried to establish a better systern of deciding for war, by shifting the locus of responsibility from one person to a broadly representative group. Th.e Persian Gulf crisis has shown all too vividly what dangers lie in the persis'tence of processes that p\lt aweson1e amounts of force at the disposition of single individuals, and how much is at stake in developing and nurturing structures of deliberation and accountability.
Two sorts of legal and institutional safeguards can help ensure that any decision leading to combat is made as carefully and wisely as possible.
1 First is the safeguard of political control within states, as established in constitutional law or otherwise. Within the United States, for example, the prerogatives of Congress to decide on war are embodied in the Constitution and affirmed in the War Powers Resolution; *Visiting Professor of International Law, Cornell University.
